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The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders 
by Securities Regulators in Canada 
Executive Summary 
The purpose of this study is to examine the use of discretionary enforcement powers 
by securities regulators in Canada, in order to assess the implications of multiple regulators for 
the enforcement of securities law. 
Regulatory enforcement decisions for the last three (and in some provinces, five) years 
were reviewed along the following parameters: 
• nature of infraction; 
• whether the respondent was previously known to enforcement personnel; 
• connection between public interest analysis and goals of securities regulation; 
• use of extra-provincial regulatory precedents in decision; 
• articulation of distinct provincial interest in sanctioning respondent; 
• nature of sanction imposed; 
• use of regulatory precedents to structure discretion; and 
• use of aggravating/mitigating factors to structure outcome. 
The findings of the study are that: 
• There was significant variation in emphasis across the provinces in relation to 
infractions pursued to an enforcement hearing. Some provinces focussed, for 
example, on illegal distributions of securities and others on acting as abro^er ° 
advisor without registration. There was more than a trivial number of instances 
where respondents had been the subject of enforcement proceedings in the past. 
Local regulators appear to play a significant role in the setting of enforcement 
priorities. 
• There was notable consistency across the provinces in evil's of 
interest that was the basis for making orders. It tend,id to be 1ntad Qf 
maintaining public confidence in, and integrity o , C'*P provincial objectives 
market efficiency. There was almost no expression of^ ^ v1^' °J ,he 
in making public interest orieis, suggesting a high degree of consistency 
philosophical underpinnings of regulatory intervention. 
. On the other hand, there was some 
sanctioning factors to individual respon e , reliance on two regulatory 
quantum of penalties^ factors reievan. to the 
precedents - one each from B. . inces te„ded to make use of the 
individual sanctioning decision. The tagg P 
multiple sanctions at their disposal m 
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These findings suggest that: 
• the status quo would be enhanced by additional transparency about the setting of 
provincial enforcement priorities and coordination among the provinces with respect 
to the mitigating/aggravating factors that structure sanctioning discretion. 
• Similar attempts at coordination would be beneficial in relation to a passport system 
which envisages a continued role for local enforcement, based on the jurisdiction of' 
the investor making a complaint. If this model is adopted, care should be taken not 
to lose the benefit of local provincial knowledge about dubious market participants. 
• Under a single regulator, a decentralized enforcement model - allowing for local 
enforcement offices across the country - would be preferable to a more centralized 
enforcement model. Local input into the setting of national enforcement priorities and 
the development of a consistent approach to dealing with the factors influencing the 
quantum and type of penalty should be preserved. 
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The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders 
by Securities Regulators in Canada1 
1. Purpose and Objectives of Study 
This is a study of the use of discretionary administrative powers in relation to 
enforcement that are provided to securities regulators in all the provincial securities statutes. 
These powers allow the making of various kinds of orders affecting market participants such as 
registrants, issuers, or officers and directors of issuers. The study is a component of the research 
agenda established to assist the Wise Persons' Committee in its deliberations about a securities 
regulatory structure for Canada. The research agenda intended to support the Committee's work 
includes an examination of the enforcement of securities regulation. The mandate is to consider 
the extent to which, and how, the existence of multiple securities regulators has an impact on 
the enforcement of securities laws across the country. 
A variety of techniques are available for the enforcement of securities law. As identified 
in Appendix 1, they include: criminal sanctions under the Criminal Code, penal sanctions under 
securities law (e.g. for insider trading, prospectus misrepresentations), and administrative 
sanctions (e.g. cease trading orders, denial of registration exemptions). 
The present study is exclusively concerned with the exercise of administrative 
sanctioning powers by regulators. There are a number of reasons why it is important to focus on 
this aspect of the enforcement of securities law: 
1 These powers are particularly important to securities regulators because the regulators 
themselves control how and when they are used, in accordance with their governing 
legislation. Unlike penal sanctions or civil powers, courts are not involved at the 
decision stage. 
2. These powers are used to sanction market participants more frequently th™^e , 
sanct i o n s  i n  m a n y  p r o v i n c e s .  T h e y  t y p i c a l l y  p r o v i d e  a  q u i c k e r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a n  i s s u e  a i d  
for enforcement staff, a more manageable burden of proof. 
if the results of an investigation do not provide adequate pounds for optimism that penal 
sanctions would result, to opt to seek an administrative order instead. 
3. Although the orders that can be made by regulators are typically 
sanctions that may be imposed by courts, significant reliance ,s placetI on regu 
expertise of securities commissions in making these decisions, and an amount 
deference is accorded to them on judicial review. 
1 Thanks are due to Gordon Boissonneault, Raymonde Crete, Prakash Narayanan, Lyn 
Eithne Condon for their assistance. mmnliance order. 
2 There is also the possibility in some provinces oftcivd orders.from aco ^ ^ ^  Committeefor the Equal 
3 See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent Commission), [2001 ] 2 S.C.R. 132. 
Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. 
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4. Typically, securities law requires these orders to be made in the "public interest", leaving 
it to the regulators to interpret what the public interest requires in any specific case. 
It is necessary to consider the way in which this discretion is exercised by provincial 
regulators so as to understand the effects of multiple securities regulators on enforcement. 
Thus the issue is whether there any significant differences in the way discretionary public interest 
powers are exercised by provincial securities regulators. Is the "public interest" protected by the 
British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) differently interpreted from that in Ontario 
or Quebec? Knowing whether it appears that each province is engaged in a unique enforcement 
enterprise, or alternatively, that there is substantial convergence in the subject matter and 
approach of provincial enforcement efforts, will inform the Committee's deliberations 
and proposals. 
2. Scope of Study and Methodology 
As the purpose of the study is to review the use made by regulators of the power to make 
administrative orders and the interpretation of the public interest contained in the statutory 
provisions providing the legal basis for that power, the focus was on those instances where 
regulators provided reasons for their decisions.4 Decisions were initially collected in each 
province dating from January 1, 2000 on. While this cutoff date provided a reasonable sample of 
decisions in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec, it yielded only a small number in 
other provinces. Accordingly in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and 
PEI, decisions were retrieved from January 1998 on.5 For each province therefore, the following 
number of decisions was reviewed6: 
One issue that is raised by this approach to data gathering is the handling of matters that were resolved by 
sett ement agreement (SA). While in some provinces there were only a moderate number of matters resolved in 
this fashion (Manitoba: 2; Quebec: 6; New Brunswick: 6; PEI: 1), in others there were a large number of SAs 
unngthe relevant period. For example in Ontario there were 80; in B.C, 98, and in Alberta, 20. Ultimately 
matters resolved by SA were excluded from the sample for reasons of substance and manageability. 
u stantive y, SAs are typically approved by regulators without a discussion of the interpretation of the public 
interest leading to the imposition of a sanction, or extensive discussion of the factors influencing the choice and 
quantum o sanction. SAs also clearly raise different issues than contested hearings do in relation to the sanction 
impose . or example, SAs will not typically emphasize specific deterrence, since they require the agreement of 
the respondent. Similarly general deterrence will play less of a role, since agreement is often reached by the 
imposi ion of a lesser sanction in return for the cooperation of the respondent. While the use of SAs does mean 
a signi icant num er of matters are diverted out of the securities enforcement system before an opportunity 
arises for regulatory consideration of issues related to the public interest and the goals of enforcement, the 
a ° 6 ^ ea, arSam ln criminal law is illuminating here. Although it is widely known that the vast 
T mfractlons never make il t0 the trial stage, significant aspects of criminal law and practice 
infrartm °n 'i P™"ou'1^emeijts of courts. Having said this, some relevant information about the nature of 
^ mfractions resolved by SA m the larger provinces is described in Section 4 of this study. 
this was not th securities commissions publish their enforcement decisions on their websites. Where 
provided by t0 ^  matenaL N° d6C1Si°nS 
an ultimate derisiona complete list of the decisions considered. Where a matter involved both findings and 
ultimate decision about sanctions that were reported separately, they were treated as one decision 
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British Columbia 29 
Alberta 11 
Saskatchewan 2 
Manitoba 4 
Ontario 13 
Quebec7 17 
New Brunswick 3 
Nova Scotia 3 
PEI 1 
Total 83 
Situations where, on the basis of the investigation conducted by enforcement staff, 
it was determined that penal sanctions should be sought, were also excluded. 
In reviewing the sample of regulatory decisions, three parameters were identified as 
particularly important. 
The first parameter related to the subject matter of the hearings. Was it possible to 
conclude that one province consistently placed an emphasis, in the use of administrative orders, 
on reprimanding registrants for giving improper advice, whereas another focused more on the 
failure of issuers to file financial statements? Of course, the question of which securities law 
infractions make it to the regulatory hearing stage in any particular province is a function of 
a number of variables, only one of which is the policy choices that might be made by the 
enforcement divisions of regulatory agencies.8 However, wide disparity in the subject matter 
of regulatory orders across the country might raise some issues about the relevance or ot er^ise 
of local autonomy or expertise in enforcement matters, or fragmentation of the regulatory effort. 
This issue will be taken up again in Section 4. 
The Quebec sample is m, ""'"me'element 
rr,?b~;u. .he 
later date. Thus it was routine, during the period exami ' f „iiPtTotjons from the Director of 
a brief order from the Commission, which typically annexed the statemen ~ d fr h CVMQ involved 
Enforcement. Only three of the seventeen decisions (excluding 
a hearing dealing wtth the allegations and/or sanctionsAo e in Quebec, 
the possibility of imposing an administrative penalty, which is only a recent sa g 
It is included for J reason, despite being a request to approve a settlement agreemre.t 
As the study prepared by Charles Rivers Associates end up 
associated with broad socio-economic factors within _ laints from members of the public from year 
being pursued to a regulatory hearing might be: t e na the types of surveillance systems put in 
to vpnr-mprlin nttpntion to snecific types of securities ' "Qprnrities 
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A related issue here is the extent to which regulatory orders have been directed at 
repeat offenders. The argument has been made that a fund of "local knowledge" about 
unscrupulous actors in the securities industry is an important contribution of provincially-based 
enforcement efforts. 
The second parameter was how the concept of the "public interest" was operationalized 
by regulators in their decisions. To what extent were the goals of securities legislation - usually 
identified as investor protection, capital market efficiency and public confidence in capital 
markets - used as a guide to give content to the idea of the public interest? Here it should be 
noted that the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Asbestos9 reminded regulators that all 
of these goals, not just investor protection, should be taken into account in making regulatory 
enforcement orders. Thus Mr. Justice Iacobucci said that "...in considering an order in the public 
interest, it is an error to focus only on the fair treatment of investors. The effect of an intervention 
in the public interest on capital market efficiencies and public confidence in the capital markets 
should also be considered".10 
Was the concept of the public interest linked in any way to specifically provincial 
interests? As it is currently organized, securities law is provincial, so that the jurisdiction of 
regulators is taken to extend only to enforcement in that province. However, this is not a 
complete answer to the question of whether the substance of the provincial interests being 
addressed in securities enforcement matters differs from province to province. For example, do 
some provinces more than others make reference to supporting local entrepreneurial or market 
activity in the context of enforcement? Do some provinces distinguish between the protection of 
retail or institutional investors in the province? An indicator of convergence or divergence here 
might be to discover the extent to which regulatory decisions from other provinces were used 
approvingly in enforcement decision-making. Widespread use of extra-provincial regulatory 
precedents could be argued to have a "convergence effect" on provincial decision-making. 
The third parameter was the specific nature of the sanctions imposed. The relevant legal 
provisions typically provide a number of alternative orders that might be applicable to any given 
infraction (such as cease trading securities, reprimanding actors, assigning costs). Was there 
consistency within and across provinces in relation to the severity and type of sanction imposed 
for comparable infractions? The ability to draw robust conclusions here, of course, is limited by 
the reality that sanctioning decisions are relatively fact-specific. Is it possible to compare the 
factors that were used to make determinations as to the appropriate type and severity of sanction? 
Again, the use of sanctioning precedents as a way of structuring the discretion of regulators is a 
relevant consideration here. 
Supra note 3. 
Ibid. 
420 
Section 3 of the study will describe the research findings, by province, under each of 
these parameters. Section 4 will analyze the findings, paying particular attention to conclusions 
that may be drawn about levels of convergence or divergence of regulatory effort in the 
enforcement area. Section 5 will consider the implications of the findings in the context of 
current reform proposals, that is, a "passport" system or a national regulator. 
3. Findings 
(a) Subject Matter 
(i) British Columbia 
As demonstrated by Chart 1, a variety of matters attracted enforcement orders by the 
BCSC over the three years considered.11 Commissioners reserved some harsh criticism for those 
matters involving registrant shortcomings, describing such behaviours as particularly prejudicial 
to the public interest. The data indicate that the most striking recent trend in British Columbia 
was the frequency of hearings dealing with the distribution of securities without a prospectus. 
Eleven of the 29 decisions reviewed involved this infraction. Many involved complainants who 
were unsophisticated investors. For example, in the BCSC decision of Dix, the Commission 
noted that "the tragic element is that [the respondents] targeted an especially vulnerable group -
the elderly and unsophisticated. Most were over 80 and had no knowledge of investment 
matters". 
With respect to the possible involvement of previous offenders, 4 of the hearings 
reviewed related to individuals previously sanctioned by the BCSC, one involved an individual 
previously sanctioned by the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE) and one by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).12 
"in each province, some decisions nivolved «than on. .nfrae.ion, and so ,he ioial number of cases reporicd 
in the charts may exceed the number of decisions. matter and 
.dm,;™ a n C involved market participants involved in criminal proceedings m ihe same maiier. 
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Chart 1: British Columbia 
Subject matter Number of cases 
Fraud 7 
Theft 2 
Misrepresentation 4 
Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration 11 
Failure to file insider trading reports 5 
Failure to fulfil directors' duties 3 
Market manipulation 2 
Operating a "boiler room" 2 
Violating "know your client" rule 2 
Failure to maintain working capital 
Failure to establish proper procedures 1 
Conduct unbecoming a registrant 1 
Failure to comply with conflict of interest rules 1 
Failure to comply with fair dealing rules 1 
(ii) Alberta 
Chart 2 shows that more types of infraction pursued to the hearing stage by enforcement 
staff in Alberta involved inappropriate behaviour by market intermediaries. However, by far the 
most common subject matter for a hearing was that of distributing securities without a prospectus 
or registration. This issue recurred 7 times in the 11 decisions, and was described by the Alberta 
Securities Commission (ASC) in the Stuart Mutuals decision as involving the "most serious 
category of violations". 
In relation to "previously known" offenders, 3 of the 11 decisions involved individuals 
who had been the subject of previous regulatory orders by the ASC. One respondent had 
previously been sanctioned by the BCSC and one had a prior criminal conviction. 
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Chart 2: Alberta 
Subject Matter Number of cases 
Misrepresentation 1 
Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration 7 
Failure to fulfil directors' duties 1 
Trading without registration 1 
Acting as adviser without registration 1 
Carrying on business as exchange without approval 1 
Violating "know your client" rule 1 
Breach of undertaking 1 
(iii) Saskatchewan 
Only two public interest order hearings were identified between 1998 and 2003. One 
involved a mutual fund salesperson who traded in securities of a limited partnership, an activity 
for which he was not registered. In the course of this activity he advised clients to invest in 
securities which were unsuitable for them. The other also involved a mutual fund salesperson, 
who traded securities known as "prime bank instruments that the Saskatchewan Securities 
Commission (SSC) found "closely resembles a notorious fraud". In neither case had the 
respondent been previously sanctioned by the Commission. 
(iv) Manitoba 
Three of the four instances reviewed concerned variations on the theme of breach of 
the "know your client" rule by registrants, with one of these also involving account churning. 
Thus there were recommendations of unsuitable investments and investment strategy, ai ure 
to record client information properly, improper projections of the future value o securities an 
unauthorized trading. The final case was one of trading securities without registration or a 
prospectus, along with representations as to the future value of the securities an J-ure^ 'J § 
on an exchange. None of the respondents involved were previously known to the Manitoba 
Securities Commission (MSC). 
(v) Ontario 
The Ontario sample is weighted towards registrant-related issues, 
Char, 3. This focus is consistent wtth a comment 
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dealer selling to clients from a principal position] have become the focus of enforcement activity 
ta recent years since unbridled business self-interest can conflict with the best interests of a 
firm's clients". 
A minor but visible theme in the Ontario sample, however, is attention to corporate 
governance shortcomings. This is demonstrated by the specific instances of failure to fulfill 
corporate governance obligations, investment funds not used for proper corporate purposes, and 
prohibited representations about the refunding of the price of shares. 
Two decisions in the sample involved respondents who had been the subject of regulatory 
action by the OSC in the past. Another involved a respondent who had given a previous 
undertaking to the SSC and a third involved an individual who had made previous settlement 
agreements with the CDNX and the TSE. Finally one respondent had been convicted in criminal 
proceedings in New York. 
Chart 3: Ontario 
Subject Matter Number of cases 
Insider trading 1 
Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration 1 
Failure to file insider trading reports 1 
Failure to make full, true and plain disclosure of material facts 1 
Failure to disclose material changes 1 
Failure to fulfil corporate governance obligations 1 
Improper use of investment funds 1 
Making prohibited representations re refunding share price 1 
Trading without registration 4 
Acting as adviser without registration 2 
Breach of obligation to act in client's best interests 2 
Failure to deal fairly and honestly with clients 1 
Conduct unbecoming a registrant 1 
Excessive markups by securities dealer 1 
Failure to disclose financial interests 1 
Breach of settlement agreement 1 
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(vi) Quebec 
Chart 4 shows that the infractions dealt with in the Quebec sample are widely dispersed 
over a number of issues, but again are clearly weighted towards a variety of registration-related 
issues, and specifically those of acting as a broker without registration, and acting as a financial 
advisor without registration.13 
Two of the cases involved respondents who had previously been the subject of 
enforcement action: one whose registration had been cancelled, and the other who had been 
ordered to cease trading and engaging in financial advising. 
Chart 4: Quebec 
Subject Matter Number of cases 
Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration 2 
Issuing securities in contravention of ME rules 1 
Signing false prospectus 1 
Abuse of exemptions 1 
Inadequate disclosure in financial statements 1 
Failure to abide by issuers policy on information disclosure 1 
Failure to file insider trading reports 2 
Trading without registration 6 
Acting as adviser without registration 5 
Acting as portfolio manager without registration 1 
Failure of underwriter to act with diligence, competence and probity 1 
Failure to consider clients' interests 
1 
Appropriation of client funds 
1 
Failure to maintain sufficient risk adjusted capital 
1 
Making prohibited undertakings re listing of securities 
2 
13 There was some overlap in these two categories. 
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(vii) New Brunswick14 
All three cases involved an assessment of whether it is in the public interest to suspend 
or cancel a registration. The impugned behaviour of two of the registrants involved, respectively, 
trading securities without a certificate (prospectus), and assisting a non-registrant to process 
securities trades. The third registrant proceeded against had engaged in a wide variety of 
inappropriate behaviour.15 
In the latter case, enforcement staff had been concerned about the individual's suitability 
for registration in 1991, because of his failure to disclose his second bankruptcy within six years 
At that time, registration had been reinstated subject to specific conditions of registration and a 
requirement for close supervision by the employer. 
(viii) Nova Scotia 
All of the decisions involved hearings to approve settlement agreements, all involved 
the same type of matter and the reasons were crafted in almost identical terms in all three cases. 
The three respondents involved were investment funds which offered securities pursuant to the 
Community Economic-Development Corporation Regulations. Each contravened the provisions 
of these regulations by failing to provide the required information circulars to their security 
holders and by failing to obtain majority approval for various investments. 
(ix) PEI16 
In determining whether a registrant {Morse) would be eligible for re-registration, the 
Director of Corporations uncovered examples of breach of fiduciary duties to clients (by way 
of taking loans from clients) as well as trading securities to clients without a prospectus. 
(b) Concept of the Public Interest 
(i) British Columbia 
Here the most common interpretation of the public interest, as it relates to the overall 
goals of securities law, was that of the need to maintain the "integrity of the capital markets". 
Almost all of the decisions reviewed used that formulation as a way of describing the purpose of 
public interest orders or the need to impose a sanction in the specific case, and in some instances 
the suggestion was made that this was significant above and beyond harm to specific investors. 
The public interest orders that can be made by securities regulators in New Brunswick extend only to 
^ registration issues. A registration may be suspended or cancelled in the public interest. 
fo'i behaJ!0l*r 'nc'uhed. taking loans from clients; failure to disclose material facts about investments to clients; 
tn /-u ° aS an^ruPtt0 securities regulators; failure to ensure client's interests paramount; intent 
com^ittIngCfrluduLTacts.rePOrt S6CUntieS Vlolatlons' violation of special conditions of registration; and 
othermrnvinnpSeCTt>^eS re®ldat°rs to make public interest orders in PEI is likewise more circumscribed than in 
or susnenH a S ' t ?tOT fthe dlscretlon to remove exemptions in the public interest, and may also grant 
DirecTormnJuf'rn a apphcatl0n for registration may be refused "where on reasonable grounds the Director considers the order to be necessary". 
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Only four of the decisions linked the public interest to all three of the typical legislative goals 
(investor protection, capital market efficiency, and public confidence). While two decisions 
considered the importance of striking a balance between investor protection and facilitating 
capital raising, no decision singled out capital market efficiency as a predominant way of 
characterizing the public interest. Some of the decisions noted that the purpose of making public 
interest orders was to be preventive and prospective, in other words, to avoid future harm rather 
than to remedy past infractions. 
In terms of whether the making of public interest orders was linked to specifically 
provincial concerns, the evidence here is limited. Only two decisions addressed this in any way. 
In Cartaway, the BCSC noted that although the issuer was a reporting issuer in Alberta and its 
securities were traded only on the Alberta Stock Exchange, "there was a national market for 
Cartaway shares" and residents of British Columbia were trading the shares in the secondary 
market. Furthermore the registrants whose conduct was impugned in the decision were employed 
in Vancouver. Thus "it is within this context that we will exercise our public interest 
jurisdiction". On the other hand, in Fairtide the Commission noted that "unregistered trading 
and advising are serious problems in our capital markets and pose a significant threat to 
investors, whether or not they reside in our province". 
None of the BCSC decisions referred to precedents derived from other provincial 
regulatory agencies, and only one made reference to an SEC decision. 
(ii) Alberta 
Several of the recent Alberta enforcement decisions did not place their analysis of the 
public interest in the context of the overall goals of securities law. However, earlier decisions 
tended to focus on the need to make public interest orders for investor protection purposes and 
to maintain the integrity of the capital markets. Again, there was no attention paid to the goal of 
achieving efficiencies in the markets, though one decision quoted approvingly the reminder fr°m 
Mr Justice Iacobucci in Asbestos that the public interest encompassed all three goals of securities 
regulation. Thus, typical comments were those of the ASC in the Stuart Mutuals decision, to the 
effect that "we cannot protect the public interest and the integrity of the capital markets if we 
tolerate deliberate violations of securities law..." or, in Lamoureux that "The Commission and 
other securities regulatory authorities in Canada have also expressed their view that, when 
making orders under s.198 or 199... to protect the public, we consider a broad range of factors.... 
There was even more uniformity in the Alberta decisions about the requirement that 
public interest orders are "preventive in nature and prospective in orientation , that is, oriented 
towards the prevention of future harm rather than the punis ment o in 
17 In the Noram Capital Management case, reference was made to an OSC decision m the same^matter. 
18 A frequently-quoted formulation of this is to be found in the ASCT^9^ fZT" 
the public interest encompasses a broad range of paTalerting others 
future conduct of a particular respondent who has en£age . . h that 0ffending persons will not be 
that inappropriate conduct will be halted by the Board and mfonmng o her hal^ g ^ wcl, as 
allowed to participate in the industry; prescribing public capital 
adjudicating on other factors which may be specific to individual 
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The World Stock Exchange decision noted that "it is impossible to precisely define 
the public interest in the context of innovative or evolving exchange activity. While the public 
interest remains relatively constant, and is quite clearly reflected in the regulatory requirements 
imposed upon the actual activities of recognized exchanges, exchange activities are almost 
infinitely variable". Thus for the ASC "the most important distinguishing characteristic of the 
WSE [World Stock Exchange] is its general lack of regulation, manifested in business practices 
that are contrary to the public interest". Two decisions emphasized the special role of registrants 
in the protection of the public interest. 
One striking feature of the Alberta sample is the resort to regulatory precedent in 
outlining the general principles to be used to guide discretionary sanctioning. These precedents 
encompassed decisions of the ASC itself, such as Matheson, occasionally the BCSC's Eron and 
Orr decisions (see below), but in five decisions included precedents from the OSC. The two OSC 
decisions most frequently cited were Mithras Management and Belteco. 
In terms of our inquiry as to whether the public interest being protected was composed of 
distinctly provincial concerns, only two of the decisions are noteworthy. World Stock Exchange 
concerned an "Internet stock exchange" which solicited a number of Albertans and Alberta 
companies to raise money on the WSE. In response to the claim that WSE was not carrying on 
business in Alberta, the ASC concluded that it had "legitimate interest in applying Alberta law 
to the WSE merely because its activities have unlawful consequences here". Furthermore 
"the WSE's potential victims include anyone with Internet access so, in this situation, comity 
encourages us to apply Alberta law because the WSE's links to Alberta allow us to act and 
because we would want other jurisdictions to take a similar approach". 
The Morrison Williams decision concerned an investment portfolio manager based in 
Toronto who provided advice to a single client in Alberta, while unregistered under the Alberta 
statute. The ASC noted that "local registration has always been a fundamental tenet of securities 
regulation . This "does not imply that we have less faith in other regulators regarding registration 
and prospectus requirements.... Rather, it reflects one of the objectives of the Act, namely 
protection of local public investors". The ASC must "look to the effect of the activity in Alberta 
and the consequences for Alberta investors". 
(iii) Saskatchewan 
Relatively little attention was paid in either of these decisions to expanding on the 
meaning of the public interest in applying enforcement orders. However, it was noted in the 
application of sanctions in the Bergen case that "as the conduct involved a significant number 
of people and attendant publicity it constituted a significant setback to confidence in the 
Saskatchewan capital markets". Bergen's conduct was contrary to the public interest because he 
had not demonstrated the knowledge and attitudes necessary to fulfil his duties as a registrant". 
No extra-provincial precedents were cited to clarify the requirements of the public interest, nor 
was any uniquely provincial definition of the public interest identified. 
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(iv) Manitoba 
Little attention was paid to expanding on the meaning of the public interest in the course 
of determining sanctions in these cases. Max Systems, which involved trading securities without 
a prospectus, enumerated a number of "public interest factors" which removed the matter from 
"being simply a technical breach". These included factors such as the sale of securities to the 
estate of a seriously injured minor, undertakings as to the future price of the securities, and false 
and misleading statements made to investors and to staff of the MSC. The Commission in the 
same case noted that its actions "must appear to punish fault and protect any future investors", 
echoing the future-oriented nature of the reasoning in other enforcement decisions. No extra-
provincial precedents were cited to clarify the requirements of the public interest, nor was any 
uniquely provincial definition of the public interest identified. 
(v) Ontario 
Several of the decisions in the Ontario sample linked the idea of the public interest to the 
achievement of the goals of securities law. Thus in Lydia Diamond, the OSC noted that it was 
"required to exercise [its] jurisdiction under ss. 127 and 127.1 of the Act by making orders in the 
public interest, taking into account the purpose of the Act in s. 1.1 and the principles set out in s. 
2.1". Looking across the span of the decisions however, it is possible to see that more attention 
tended to be paid to the idea of protecting the integrity of the capital markets and confidence in 
those markets than the other purposes. For example in Banks, the OSC said that "if we do not 
restrain Banks properly, confidence in our markets would be weakened . 
The Donnini case did allude to the goal of capital market efficiency, in the specific 
context of the payment of costs as an aspect of public interest sanctioning. Thus, the commission 
considered that "cost recovery is fair to other participants in the capital markets. In Asbestos, 
Justice Iacobucci emphasized the importance of the Commission considering the e lciency o 
the capital markets when exercising its public interest discretion . Eight of the ntano ecision 
declared that public interest orders were required to be preventative and prospective rather than 
oriented towards punishing respondents. 
One unique feature of the Ontario sample is the linking of the OSC's public inte^st 
jurisdiction to maintaining appropriate standards of corporate governance, or ex^™P 
it was decided that "...where a respondent has egregiously failed to adhere to 
or principles of corporate governance, and a respondent s past con uc as co 
without one or more orders, future haim is likely to occur, it is appropriate for us to make 
order m the public interest". A similar concern is evident m Meridian Resources. 
hi Lydia Diamond, the OSC described !^ that 
the interests of the respondents and the interests o p , nnblic interest" 
breach of a settlement agreement was "itself an action contrary to the public interest . 
There is very little evidence in the Ontario 
to interpret the concept of the public interest. Only the Valent 
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regulation decision from the B.C. Court of Appeal to ground the OSC's analysis of the basis 
for extending a temporary cease trading and suspension of registration order. The OSC's own 
Mithras Management decision was cited several times, as was Asbestos. 
(vi) Quebec 
It has been noted already that only three of the Quebec sample involved a hearing by 
the CVMQ. The emphasis in two decisions was on the goal of investor protection. In Shedleur, 
involving an underwriter who participated in an underwriting where only a fraction of the funds 
raised was retained for the objectives listed in the prospectus, and who signed off on a prospectus 
containing false information, the Commission noted that one of the objectives of the law was to 
frame the behaviour of professionals in the marketplace in order to protect investors. A comment 
from Pezim concerning the protective role of securities regulators was also quoted approvingly 
in the decision. 
In Laliberte, which specifically addressed the power of the CVMQ to render an 
enforcement decision without a hearing, it was noted that decisions were made in the public 
interest, and more generally to avoid serious prejudice to the functioning of the markets, to 
protect investors against underhand, abusive and fraudulent practices and to promote the 
disclosure of adequate information to the market. 
In Bombardier the Commission said that in defining the public interest, it generally 
referred to its mission, defined in s. 276 of the Quebec statute as the promotion of efficiency, 
the protection of investors, the regulation of information disclosure and the definition of a 
framework for the activities of professionals. The same case also noted that despite its obligation 
to achieve these goals, it also had the obligation to treat fairly those subject to its authority. All 
three decisions asserted that the objective was not to punish individuals. In Exploration Malartic-
Sud, the Director of Enforcement's application to the Commission for sanctions against the 
officers and directors of the company noted that it was in the public interest that those who 
authorized the issuing of company securities in contravention of MSE rules should not be 
allowed to trade those securities until the company conformed with the rules. 
In Shedleur, the Commission referred to the Supreme Court of Canada decisions of 
Pezim, Asbestos and Global Securities, as well as the OSC precedent of Ames, a decision also 
involving the responsibilities of underwriters. Elowever there was no articulation of a uniquely 
Quebecois definition of the public interest in these decisions. 
(vii) New Brunswick 
Given the specific nature of the public interest power in New Brunswick, it is not 
surprising that the meaning of the public interest was articulated in the context of registrant 
responsibilities. Thus, in Arsenault, it was noted that "(T)he privilege of registration under the 
Securities Act imposes on individuals important standards in order to protect the investing public 
and ensure that overall public interest is maintained". Here it is also suggested that the ethical 
standards required of registrants have become more onerous because of "the increasing number 
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of investors and the importance the investing process has become (sic) for most citizens". 
Bond stated that "(B)reach of industry codes of ethics ... are equated by regulators as being 
contrary to the public interest". 
More generally, Bond referred to the goals of securities regulation articulated in the 
Ontario statute as a possible guide to the public interest. The Administrator continued that 
"...the public interest... must encompass ... all investors resident in New Brunswick and the 
regulatory system itself which the legislature has put in place to protect them. The integrity 
of this system can be jeopardized even if there is no evidence of immediate, substantial or 
individual harm". Other than this reference to investors resident in New Brunswick, no specific 
provincial definition of the public interest was articulated. 
(viii) Nova Scotia 
Most of the Commissions reasons were taken up with discussion of the appropriateness 
or otherwise of the sanctions sought by enforcement staff. No reference was made in the 
decisions to the goals of securities law, though the decision was clearly grounded in concern for 
"harm to security holders" and specifically the exposure of their investment to "greater risks" by 
the lack of disclosure and opportunity to debate the merits of specific investments. No regulatory 
precedents were cited. 
In so far as these decisions turned on the failure to abide by the provisions of a specific 
program which offered an "abbreviated public offering process designed to provide the ^ 
Respondent with a cost effective means of accessing a community based capital market", there 
is a specific provincial interest articulated here. This is an interest in the existence of this 
program and its appropriate use by investment entities, in order to further local investment goa s, 
while minimizing risks to investors. 
(ix) PEI 
It was noted in Morse that "ethical conduct is vital to ensuring the integrity of markets" 
and that "the industry consistently puts forth requirements of high ethical "aid ucl for 
protection of the public and the industry... Business conduct which is 
L public interest will not be tolerated". No precedents were cited, and no specifically provincial 
public interest was articulated. 
(c) Sanctions Imposed 
(i) British Columbia 
j • in r r was that multiple sanctions were 
One consistent feature of sanctioning decisi • • d & c£ase tra<jmg order, a 
almost always employed. Thus an individual or issuer typ -mes a costs orc]er. a prohibition 
denial of exemptions order, an admmistratwejiena ty,^a^ ^ cQmmon sanction employed, and 
on acting as a director or officer of an issuer w , activities was often included, 
where registrants were involved, a prohibition on investor relations activities 
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We have noted that the largest category of infraction in this sample was that of 
distributing securities without a prospectus. In terms of the time periods for which the 
multiplicity of sanctions noted above were imposed, on two occasions exemptions were denied 
for five years and a low administrative penalty was imposed ($5,000). However in the majority 
of instances the time periods involved ranged from 10 years up to a permanent cease trading 
or denial of exemptions order, and administrative penalties ranged from $25,000 to $100,000. 
In the case of the most serious types of infractions, such as fraud or market manipulation, time 
periods began at eight years and administrative penalties at $10,000. One fraud case involved an 
administrative penalty of $200,000. At the lower end of the seriousness spectrum, for example 
infractions of insider reporting rules, there was again some fluctuation in the time periods and 
penalties involved. Here, the range was between six months and five years and penalties were 
between $3,000 and $10,000. 
Some attempt to structure the exercise of sanctioning discretion was evident, by means of 
the employment of specific BCSC precedents which enumerated a list of relevant factors to assist 
in decision-making. Two decisions were consistently cited: Orr, an insider reporting case, and 
Eron Mortgage, a February 2000 decision which involved distributing securities without a 
prospectus and misrepresentation. As Orr itself cited the factors listed in Eron, it is fair to say 
that the latter is the current benchmark in B.C. for enumeration of the factors to be considered 
in making various types of sanctioning decisions. These factors are: 
• the seriousness of respondent's conduct; 
• the harm suffered by investors as a result of the respondent's conduct; 
• the damage done to the integrity of the capital markets in British Columbia by the 
respondent's conduct; 
• the extent to which the respondent was enriched; 
• factors that might mitigate the respondent's conduct; 
• the respondent's past conduct; 
• the risk to investor and the capital markets posed by the respondent's continued 
participation in the capital markets of British Columbia; 
• the respondent's fitness to be a registrant or to bear the responsibilities associated 
with being a director, officer or adviser to issuers; 
• the need to demonstrate the consequences of inappropriate conduct to those who 
enjoy the benefits of access to the capital markets; 
• the need to deter those who participate in the capital markets from engaging in 
inappropriate conduct; and 
• orders made by the Commission in similar circumstances in the past. 
It should be noted that there is currently some legal controversy in relation to the "general 
deterrence" factors enumerated as relevant in Eron. A majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal has 
ruled in Cartaway that the SCC decision in Asbestos should be interpreted as holding that 
securities regulators' public interest function allows them only to consider specific deterrence 
in fixing the amount of administrative penalties. 
19 (2002) BCCA 461. 
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The Orr decision m November 2UU1 added to this list another set of factors specifically 
relevant to the situation of failure to file insider trading reports. This list was gleaned from earlier 
BCSC decisions and settlements involving the reporting of insider trades. This list consists of 
the following factors: 
• the volume of shares in the unreported trades compared to total trading in the stock-
• the number of unreported trades; 
• the duration of the non-compliance; 
• whether the respondent disclosed and rectified the deficiencies voluntarily; 
• the respondent's subsequent conduct; 
• the respondent's previous disciplinary history; 
• the respondent's cooperation with the Commission staff investigation; and 
• the presence of any aggravating factors. 
Many of the decisions reviewed can be seen to be applying the various factors identified 
in Eron, such as the risk to investors if the respondent continues to be present in the markets, 
the respondent's lack of prior regulatory problems, or the extent to which the respondent received 
payment for his/her efforts. A few additional mitigating factors also appear in some decisions, 
such as the respondent's acknowledgment of his responsibilities as a registrant, whether or not 
the respondent cooperated with commission staff in the investigation, or a last minute restitution 
payment. Finally the issue of whether or not to take into account the consequences of the 
sanction to the respondent seems to cause some controversy. A couple of decisions show a 
willingness to reduce the administrative penalty based on ability to pay, while another notes 
that it would not "serve the public interest to permanently deprive [the respondent] of career 
opportunities". Yet another decision notes that the consequences to the respondent of the 
sanction to be imposed is not a relevant factor. 
(ii) Alberta 
In relation to the most commonly found infraction — distributing securities without a 
prospectus — there was significant variation in the sanctions imposed in different cases, ranging 
from a case where multiple sanctions (denial of exemptions, cease trading and a prohibition on 
acting as a director or officer) were imposed for one year to one where the multiple sanctions 
were imposed for 20 years along with an administrative penalty of $25,000. The difference 
appears to reflect the presence of "aggravating factors" in the latter situation, such as the 
characterization of the illegal distribution by the ASC as a "deliberate and deceptive 
victimization of investors" as well as an "intentional breach of [an] undertaking to the ASC. 
Similarly, as might be expected, multiple respondents in the same matter are treated differently 
according to the degree of culpability found by regulators. 
We have seen that both ASC and other regulatory precedents are used in these decisions 
to guide the factors relevant to the sanctioning decision. The ASC's Press decision was twice 
cited for the proposition that there is a spectrum of circumstances relevant to a sanction for an 
illegal distribution, depending on whether there was an intention to comp y wit t e c or o 
In another case the Eron decision from B.C. was mined for its list of factors to be considered in 
J_ • • __ U /A Q  nnnular for the same reason. 
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The relevant passage from Belteco is as follows: 
"we have been referred to decisions of this Commission which indicate that in 
determining both the nature of the sanctions to be imposed as well as the duration of such 
sanctions, we should consider the seriousness of the allegations proved; the respondent's 
experience in the marketplace; the level of a respondent's activity in the marketplace; 
whether or not there has been a recognition of the seriousness of the improprieties; and 
whether or not the sanctions imposed may serve to deter not only those involved in the 
case being considered, but any like-minded people from engaging in similar abuses of 
the capital markets". 
With respect to the deterrence factor, it should be noted that the needs of general 
deterrence were frequently cited as a relevant factor by the ASC. 
Additional aggravating factors identified by the ASC included: deliberate violation of the 
Act, lack of understanding of the appropriate regulatory duties; incompetence and exaggeration 
of profits to be made in an investment opportunity; and violation of regulatory undertakings. 
Meanwhile mitigating factors referred to included: cooperating with enforcement staff and 
reliance on legal advice. The consequences of the sanction to the respondent were not to be 
considered, nor the respondent' conduct at the hearing. In crafting appropriate sanctions, the ASC 
was twice careful to avoid imposing undue hardship on customers or "innocent employees" of 
an issuer and was prepared to limit a prohibition on acting as a director or officer of an issuer 
to holding these positions in a junior issuer only, on the basis that the latter provided limited 
oversight to compensate for the respondent' lack of judgment. 
(iii) Saskatchewan 
Both of these cases involved mutual fund salesmen trading in high risk securities for 
which they were not registered. In Singh, the SSC considered that "any association by a registrant 
in any way with the provision of information of such a dubious proposal is, if not criminal, 
grossly negligent and cannot be condoned" However, multiple sanctions (denial of exemptions, 
cease trade order, no advising order, resign as director/officer, and future prohibitions on holding 
positions as director/officer or being employed by an issuer/registrant) were applied to Singh for 
three years, and to Bergen (denial of exemptions, cease trade order, no advising order, resign as 
director/officer, and future prohibition on holding position as director/officer, administrative 
penalty of $50,000 and costs of $5,000) for ten years. 
The difference here seems to revolve around the amount of money lost and the personal 
circumstances of the respondents. In Bergen several million dollars were lost by investors, 
whereas in Singh it does not appear that any investor had yet actually invested any money. 
The SSC also noted that the personal circumstances of Mr. Singh required some consideration.20 
A lifetime of removal from the industry would be "extremely harsh". 
These were the facts that he was young, relatively new to the business of securities sales, and had four children. 
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In both cases, some attention was paid to the goal of general deterrence In Bemen the 
Commission considered the need to "demonstrate the consequences of inappropriate conduct 
to those who enjoy the benefits of access to the capital markets" In Singh, it was noted that 
"too short a period [of exclusion from the markets] will do nothing to convince any registrant 
of the extreme concern" about similar schemes. 
In Bergen mitigating factors included: his cooperation in the investigation; efforts made 
to assist customers in mitigating losses; and the fact that he was not as responsible as other actors 
to whom maximum penalties were applied. 
Finally, in Bergen, there was some resort to precedent in determining the specific 
sanctions to be applied. The factors enumerated in the BCSC decision oiEron Mortgage were 
cited, as was another BCSC regulatory decision (Connor Financial), and finally, an earlier 
settlement with a principal actor in the same incident was used for comparative purposes as 
a guide to the sanction to be imposed. 
(iv) Manitoba 
Two of the three registrant-related cases involved the sanction of a reprimand, in one 
case together with the requirement to pass an examination and to pay costs of $4,000. In the 
third case, a permanent denial of exemptions was assessed, along with costs of $20,000. In 
Max Systems, the various individuals and entities received the denial of exemptions sanction for 
different periods of time, along with denial of registration and costs for the individuals, and an 
opportunity for the issuer itself to have access to exemptions on the approval of the MSC. 
The Finley decision used the earlier registrant-related enforcement decision of Tetrault to 
guide its sanctioning decision, noting that although there were many similarities in the two cases, 
there was none in relation to the degree of fault involved. In Max Systems, the settlement 
agreement reached with another actor in the case was used to guide the sanctions imposed for 
the individual respondents. 
In terms of factors relevant to individual sanctioning decisions, we have seen that the 
seriousness of the violation was an important consideration in determining outcomes. We have 
also noted the "public interest factors" identified in Max Systems as significant in reaching an 
appropriate sanction; including the sale of highly speculative shares to the estate of someone 
unable to look after their own interests and false and misleading statements made to M$C staff. 
The decision noted that the fact that securities were traded on the basis of deficient offering 
documents "knowingly and in disregard of Commission decisions only exacerbates the offense . 
The impact on the respondent was considered, in the sense that the sanction imposed on the 
issuer itself in Max Systems was calibrated in order to allow it to continue to raise financing in 
a controlled fashion and thereby prevent harm to "innocent shareholders". 
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(v) Ontario 
Across similar infractions, e.g. trading without registration or advising without 
registration, variation can be observed in the specific orders made. This likely reflects the 
presence or'absence of "aggravating factors". Multiple sanctions (such as, cease trade orders, 
denial of exemptions, reprimand) were a feature of these decisions. On the basis of one case it is 
hard to draw a conclusion as to whether infractions considered to be more serious, such as insider 
trading, attract higher sanctions, though this is the case in the Donnini example. As might be 
expected, the costs imposed on respondents in Ontario matters tend to be significantly higher 
than in the other provinces. 
There is limited evidence of the use of regulatory precedents to guide specific sanctioning 
decisions. Belteco and the factors enumerated there makes an appearance in YBM, Lydia 
Diamond and Donnini. In Arlington, the OSC used settlements made in previous "high mark-up" 
cases as a guide in assessing appropriate sanctions. 
Aside from the guiding factors listed in Belteco, a few others can be extracted from these 
decisions. Issues such as: whether the violations were isolated or recurring, whether there was 
reliance on legal advice, whether there was a breach of a previous undertaking to a regulator, 
lack of any "real intention" to be bound by a settlement agreement, all contributed to specific 
sanctioning outcomes. Several decisions noted the importance of considering issues of specific 
and general deterrence. 
In Donnini, the OSC cited approvingly the passage from its decision in M.C.J.C. to the 
effect that the impact on the respondent was important in determining the appropriateness of 
public interest sanctions. In the same vein, the OSC tended to pay close attention to the 
connection between the impugned conduct and the actual sanction imposed. Thus a cease trading 
order and a prohibition on acting as a director or officer was not imposed in Costello, because 
the impugned conduct did not pertain to trading. In Donnini the commission noted that the 
respondent should not receive more severe sanctions than otherwise appropriate because he 
had not agreed to settle. 
Finally the Etherington case identified some relevant mitigating factors, including the 
facts that the respondent was not aware that his financial planning activities might be in breach 
of registration provisions, that his website had no customers, he had attempted to acquire the 
relevant training, and there was no evidence of financial loss. 
(vi) Quebec 
The most common sanction imposed in the Quebec sample was the cease trade order, 
though it was sometimes combined with a ban on acting as a financial advisor, or a suspension of 
registration. There was one example of a requirement to issue a press release to explain a default 
in meeting disclosure requirements, and one freeze order. The cease trading orders imposed 
tended not to be time limited, though in at least one case (Laliberte), an order was lifted on 
demonstrating that the appropriate material had been filed with the Commission. In Shedleur, 
the underwriter involved was suspended for seven years. 
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In Shedleur, the gravity of the respondent's actions and his knowledge of the securities 
markets were cited as reasons for a severe sanction. In Laliberte, the insider reporting issue, 
relevant factors cited by the Director of Enforcement were that (i) his transactions represented an 
important volume of stock exchange transactions, and (ii) a sanction was "essential" to promote 
the well-being of the market and the protection of investors. In later addressing the question of 
lifting the cease trade order in the Laliberte matter, the CVMQ noted that his behaviour 
subsequent to the initial imposition of the order was relevant to its decision. 
In Bombardier, the CVMQ remarked that had this matter involved action taken against 
the company by enforcement staff, the penalties assessed would have taken into account the harm 
to investors. Finally, no regulatory precedents were referred to in making these orders. 
(vii) New Brunswick 
In Arsenault, the respondent was suspended immediately, with the stipulation that no 
further application would be considered for 6 months, along with proof of successful completion 
of an IFIC course. In Logan, a reprimand was placed on the registrant's file. In Bond, the case 
involving the most serious infractions, the Administrator was convinced that the individual was 
unfit for registration. However, because he was not currently registered, it was resolved to place 
the decision in the respondent's file and on the public record, with the expectation that it would 
be given serious consideration should he reapply. 
The decision on sanctions in the Bond case was guided by the OSC's Mithras 
Management's discussion of the need to restrain future conduct that is likely to bePreJud,c'a0 
the public interest, along with the Smith decision of the NBCA concerning the needfo-fairness 
when assessing penalties. The decision also referred approving y to t e s earlier 
decision, in pabular its recognition of the importance of general deterrence. Beyond ^  earl er 
regulatory decisions, either of the Administrator himself or "other secunt,,® 
the IDA or the MSC, were considered less useful as a source of guidance. This was because 
penalties had become more severe over the decade. 
There was no doubt in these cases 
sanctioning decision. Bond pointed out that the Ac p , nrocesses involving 
both specific and general deterrence be consequences of adtnims f f 
registrants", and tot the latter was important .0 "mamtam an 
the protection of the investing public". However m Logan e wrongdoing" required 
"must always be balanced" with the "clear and cogent ev,deuce of serious wrongdo g 
before a registrant is to be deprived of an opportunity o earn 
Aggravating factors enumerated «c^ctions, violations of other regulatory 
distribution of securities, declarations of bankrup y, relationships which might lead to 
statutes, civil proceedings and other employmen or u "pervasive, deliberate and 
potential conflicts of interest" (Bond), as we as con J* fact0rs were the admission of the 
contrary .0 all standards of practice". Meanwhile ™ti^mg ^ |n ,he 
allegations, the lack of evidence of "intentional fraudulent conduct 
investigation, and "being humbled by the experience 
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(viii) Nova Scotia 
In each of these cases an administrative penalty of $2,500 was imposed, which was 
explicitly characterized as at the lower end of the range. Costs of $500 were also assessed.21 
No sanctioning precedents were cited. The violations involved were described as "substantive" 
as opposed to procedural. It was concluded that there was no need to consider issues of specific 
deterrence as the respondents had implemented the appropriate procedures; however it was 
determined that it is "in the public interest to impose an administrative penalty in an amount 
that will serve as a general deterrent to violations of the Community Economic-Development 
Corporation Regulations and other securities laws of Nova Scotia". 
Mitigating factors cited included the absence of malice or an "intent of personal profit" 
on the part of the respondents, as well as the fact that they were "responsive and cooperative" 
throughout the investigation. Finally, an invalid factor to consider was that the regulatory 
requirements infringed upon had been "understated" by the administrators of the program. 
(ix) PEI 
The sanction imposed in Morse was that no application for registration would be 
entertained for six months, Morse was required to rewrite and successfully complete an 
examination before being registered, and he was required to pay $2,000 towards the cost of 
the investigation. 
The Director noted that in exercising his registration discretion, "the totality of the 
candidate's application must be considered". Relevant factors were that two of the clients to 
whom Morse had breached his fiduciary duty were "unsophisticated investors", and that he had 
not been truthful with the investigators dealing with this matter. 
4. Analysis of Findings 
(a) Subject Matter 
The most striking area of variation in this comparative sample is that of the nature of 
the infractions that are the subject of public interest orders. All provinces are concerned to some 
extent about specific shortcomings in registrant behaviour, whether the issues are breach of 
the know your client rule", failure to deal with clients fairly and honestly, or in the Atlantic 
provinces, taking loans from clients. But B.C. and Alberta both pay a significant amount of 
attention to sanctioning the distribution of securities without a prospectus, especially where this 
involves sales to retail investors. This issue has not rated much attention at all in Ontario or 
The maximum allowable penalty is $100,000. The regulations to the Nova Scotia Securities Act also prescribe 
per our or the time of the Director, or any Deputy Director or any lawyer, investigator or 
accountant employed by the Commission. 
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Quebec in the last few years, with these provinces having more of a focus on acting as a market 
participant (broker/advisor) without registration22. Some provinces pay attention to whether 
insiders report their trading adequately, some do not. 
What are the implications of this difference in emphasis for analysing the impact of 
multiple regulators on enforcement? Some of the variation, of course, has to do with differences 
in the governing legal framework in relation to enforcement. We have seen that public interest 
orders in New Brunswick are only available in relation to registrants. In Quebec, cease trade 
orders can be made quickly, without a hearing; other sanctions cannot be applied in this way. 
It might also be the case that local investors complain about different things in different 
provinces, leading provincial enforcement staff to respond accordingly. It is important to 
remember, however, that provincial enforcement divisions typically receive many more 
complaints than subsequently become the subject of enforcement orders. For a variety of reasons, 
some, if not all provinces clearly engage in some form of strategic planning or priority setting 
with respect to enforcement. This priority setting may affect not only the response to complaints 
from investors. The cases reviewed suggest that enforcement personnel are also willing to take 
proactive action, for example, targeting securities dealers, approaching websites offering 
investment services to verily registration status, or acting on information received from another 
division of the agency. It appears, for example, that while B.C. made significantly more public 
interest orders than other provinces over the last few years, Ontario is more willing to address 
novel enforcement issues, such as the adequacy of corporate governance among issuers or 
22 This picture is rendered somewhat more complex if settlement agreements are taken into account We have 
that in larger provinces like BC and Ontario, more matters are resolved by SA than by contest^a™gQ 
should be noted however that a focus on numbers of settlements as opposed to heanngs mays 
the ratio of SAs to hearings. This is because some SAs in these provinces represeniseparate agrcements ^ 
different respondents in the same matter, whereas a hearing is more likely to deal globa y 
different respondents. A survey of concluded SAs in Ontario and BC during the 
27 out of 80 SAs in Ontario involved the distribution of securities without» Jtas was die mos^ 
common subject matter for an SA in Ontario. In BC, this infraction occurred 30 
also the most common subject matter there. However, in Ontario, an infraction res y ^ g ed 
almost as frequently (on 24 occasions) was that of trading without^occasions> whereas in Ontario 
in 18 SAs. In BC, failure to file insider trading reports was resolved by SA o ontario failure to 
this occurred only 3 times. Meanwhile, the next most common infractions to e supervision of traders 
assess the suitability of an investment/sale of unsuitable mvestmen s ( ) an cheiit" inquiries) 
(10) can be observed in BC SAs 5 (with an additional 5 involving failure to make know yo 
and 6 times respectively. ,, cnnnrts the 
Taken as a whole, this additional information concerning SAs does not the SA information 
points made above about variation in enforcement emp asis across without a prospectus than is visible 
from Ontario does show more attention to the issue of distributing BC context, 
from the hearings data, there still appears globally to be^ more o a without a prospectus in Ontario 
It should be noted for example that 7 of the 27 SAs ea ing further the SA information supports 
involved sales of the same securities by a number * as well as shortcomings 
the conclusion that Ontario is particularly concerne behaviour, 
in registrant (broker/advisor/mutual fond sales personne an implications for example 
» A, least where .ssuer con.or.te governance practices have secunt.es regulation unphc.tions, 
practices in relation to disclosure of information. 
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registrants, or excessive markups by securities dealers. Thus, the difference in subject matter 
emphasis across the country is, to a significant extent, a product of provincial enforcement 
policy-making. 
A complete answer to the question of why the local generation of enforcement policy 
produces different emphases in enforcement outcomes is a broader question than can be 
adequately dealt with in the context of this study. However a few comments may be made. 
It has been noted that the Charles Rivers Associates study for the Wise Persons' Committee 
emphasizes broad socio-economic factors in provinces as relevant to the question of differences 
in provincial securities enforcement trends. It has also been suggested to this researcher in 
interviews with senior enforcement personnel in several provinces that enforcement policy-
setting is reactive to the perceived reality that the nature of the local market is different, for 
example, as between B.C. and Ontario. Thus, for example, the B.C. securities market is 
considered to be dominated by promoters and junior resources companies attempting to raise 
financing in the most cost-effective manner. Similarly, the local financial services sector is 
considered to be different from that in Ontario, with respect to the size and scope of the 
registrants operating in it. 
Another possible explanation relates to how specific provincial securities commissions 
are funded. Thus, for example, an agency such as the OSC, which is funded in large part by 
revenue generated from securities industry registrants might be more likely to concentrate its 
internal enforcement resources on matters of most concern to those registered with it, in a 
context where external enforcement resources, in the form of penal sanctions, are also available. 
This hypothesis suggests that the question of how regulators are funded to undertake their 
activities is an aspect to be considered in any proposals for change. 
More generally, in terms of the mandate of the Wise Persons' Committee, the question 
then becomes whether it is optimal for local regulators to set enforcement policy. On the one 
hand, the argument, again, is that local regulators are closer to the local market, and in the best 
position to develop a sense of how and when dubious market participants might be operating in 
that market. Presumably they develop that sense in part from reacting to investor complaints and 
in part from engaging in other forms of surveillance or information gathering. On the other hand, 
it is the case that very few of the types of infraction pursued by provincial regulators are by 
definition local, although some are pursued with greater intensity in some provinces more than 
others. The fact that different inappropriate behaviours are targeted for attention in different 
provinces may result in a lack of overall coordination with respect to the focus of enforcement 
efforts, which may have an impact on the overall use of enforcement resources. It might also 
suggest that the chances of being sanctioned for specific infractions, for example distributing 
securities without a prospectus, are lesser in some provinces than others. 
Apart from the issue of establishing enforcement priorities, what do the findings of this 
study suggest about the argument that enforcement needs to be local because local enforcement 
personnel know who the "bad actors" are? It is apparent that, certainly in the bigger provinces, 
there were more than a few occasions where the respondents who were the subject of public 
interest hearings had previously come to the attention of that provincial agency. The proportions 
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are slightly more pronounced, in provinces like B.C. and Ontario, if enforcement action by the 
local stock exchange is also included. While this maybe something of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
in the sense that enforcement staff might be quicker to act on a situation involving someone they 
are aware has been previously investigated, it does suggest that it is relevant to have a base of 
local expertise in relation to market participants and their activities. 
( b )  C o n c e p t  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  I n t e r e s t  
What is the effect of multiple regulators on the meaning of the "public interest" that is 
the basis for making discretionary enforcement orders? Here there is more consistency across the 
country. There was considerable agreement that the predominant purpose of making these orders 
was to protect the integrity of the provincial capital market, and to engage in a future-oriented 
analysis of the respondent's likely behaviour, with sanctions being applied if necessary to achieve 
the goal of maintaining public confidence in the market's ongoing integrity. 
This uniform sense of the purpose of the enterprise no doubt has a lot to do with the 
convergence effect of Supreme Court decisions like Asbestos, though consensus could be 
observed even before that decision was handed down. It is noteworthy too that even since the 
Asbestos decision's stricture to consider market efficiency issues in making enforcement orders, 
this aspect has been largely ignored to date. On the other hand, the convergence effect of citing 
extra-provincial regulatory precedents to ground a public interest analysis is quite limited, as only 
the Alberta sample features this practice to any significant degree. 
It is also quite clear that in most provinces there is no robust articulation of a provincial 
public interest that can be distinguished from any existing in other provinces. While the issue 
is raised in provinces like B.C. and Alberta, it is addressed there only in the context of the 
jurisdiction of regulators to act. Since regulators' jurisdiction currently extends only to the well-
being of investors in their province, a connection to those investors typically needs to be 
established for an order to be made. 
In the sample reviewed, only Nova Scotia and Ontario could be said to have articulated a 
provincial public interest that is substantively unique: the former with reference to maintaining 
the integrity of a local investment program and the latter identifying elevated stan ar s o 
corporate governance with the public interest in a couple of decisions. 
(c) Sanctions Imposed 
In attempting to generalize about the specific sanctions that are it can 
provinces, it must be acknowledged that decisions here are quite ac spec . ^ 
be seen that the bigger provinces tended to make use of a t e sane 10" _ sanct;ons 24 jhe 
structuring specific outcomes, so that r^sPondftS ^ f^f^thTthe application of some 
exception to this is Quebec, which is likely a function 
sanctions requires a hearing and others do not. 
^ Appendix , indicate, the penalties wh.ch b. -PP^ * -* P— — » ^ ^  
legislation. 
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In B C Alberta Saskatchewan, Ontario and New Brunswick, there were attempts 
structure the'discretion to apply sanctions by resorting to regulatory precedents whtch 
enumerated factota relevant to decision-maktng. In terms of the precedents used, the provmces 
were ranged around two poles consisting of the Eron decision from B.C., and the Belleco 
decision from Ontario. Although there is quite an amount of overlap in the factors enumerated 
in both precedents (such as the seriousness of the conduct, the respondent's past conduct, 
and the need for deterrence), the Eron list includes a broader set of issues to be taken 
into account. 
All the provincial regulators, whether or not they subscribed to Eron or Belteco. also 
attempted to justify the use of their discretion to sanction by articulating mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances that helped produce specific outcomes. Chart 5 below attempts to 
capture a sense of the extent to which there was convergence around the use of these sanctioning 
factors to guide outcomes. The chart shows a large array of factors used in different provmces, 
with quite a number being subscribed to by only one or two provinces. There was most 
agreement about the relevance of (i) the respondent's level of cooperation with 
enforcement/investigation staff, and (ii) the degree of culpability for the harm caused, as 
among a number of respondents in the same matter. 
In at least one instance - the issue of whether to consider the consequences to the 
respondent in crafting the sanction - there is outright disagreement among provinces. At least 
one decision each in B.C. and Alberta take the view that the consequences to the respondent 
should not be considered in choosing the sanction, while decisions in B.C. (again), 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick are prepared to give some weight to 
this issue in determining the outcome. 
Also, there is an amount of enthusiasm across the provinces for paying attention to 
general deterrence in deciding on a regulatory sanction. However recent decisions in B.C. have 
noted that the province's Court of Appeal takes a different view of the ability of securities 
regulators to do this, so that enforcement practices here may be influenced in the future by 
a Supreme Court pronouncement on the matter. 
Thus, while employment of regulatory precedents in sanctioning practices in some 
provinces suggest attempts at harmonization, the use of a wide range of additional parameters 
for decision-making across the country indicates that much diversity remains. In terms of the 
preoccupations of the present study, the issue again is whether the ability to craft an appropriate 
sanction is inherently a local issue. It has been argued that it is appropriate for different provmces 
to have different penalties for infractions. The CSA's "Blueprint for Uniform Securities Laws for 
Canada"25 posits that "(L)ocal differences in amounts of penalties are appropriate and reflect the 
25 (2003) 26 OSCB 943. 
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fact that jurisdictions with larger markets and issuers may need a higher penalty in order for their 
enforcement powers to be meaningful".26 However it is somewhat more difficult to make this 
argument in relation to the rationale used for an enforcement outcome. It is unclear why, for 
example, reliance on legal advice should be a mitigating factor in Alberta and Ontario, but not 
in B.C.. None of the decisions reviewed articulate a rational basis for why particular mitigating or 
aggravating factors are popular in some provinces but not others. Without such a rational basis 
for variation, the effect of local autonomy in relation to the factors influencing sanctioning 
outcomes seems to be to produce unevenness and fragmentation of enforcement efforts. 
^ However,heCSAdoesarguetha.,ke Wesote— o^s» —'» " 
Ibid at 979. 
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5 Implications of the Findings for Reform Proposals 
This section considers the implications of the research findings about the use of public 
interest orders for a variety of possible reform proposals that might be made by the Wise 
Persons' Committee, such as (i) an enhanced version of the status quo; (ii) a passport system, as 
proposed in the provincial ministers' June 2003 discussion paper27; and (iii) a single regulator. 
(a) Status Quo 
If the emphasis on local autonomy in relation to enforcement is to be maintained, the 
findings above suggest that it would be beneficial to have more transparency about, and 
stakeholder input into, the development of provincial regulatory priorities in this area. This might 
help to reduce somewhat the risk of uneven enforcement coverage across the provinces in 
relation to infractions of securities law. 
With respect to the factors that influence sanctioning outcomes, greater coordination 
among the provinces would likewise be helpful in order to increase consistency, with specific 
attention paid to resolving emerging disagreements about the relevance of factors like the 
consequences of the sanction for the respondent. Some effort should be devoted to developing a 
template of appropriate factors for provincial regulators to consider m choosing the quantum and 
type of penalty. 
(b) Passport System 
As it is currently described, it does not appear that the implementation of ai passport 
system would change much about the way enforcement is cutrently » 
document assumes that "local regulators are in the best post.,on to ' 
Accord,ngly t, proposes that relattons between investors and market pat® p 
governed by regulators in the investors' jurisdiction, and the local laws ofAh < 
jurisdiction would apply. Such a system would main,am a h.gh degree o doca 
relation to how investor complaints are ultimately deal, w.th tn accordance with provtnc, 
enforcement priorities. 
In so far as it is reactive to investor complaints, it w°^da*S^ 
the overall rationalization of enforcement policy, priority setting jt might 
discretionary factors in sanction decisions. Consideration shou d be ^  ^ 
actually inhibit enforcement personnel from taking proac ^ tQ where the market 
investor complaints. The focus on where the investor is as bili. tQ capitalize on local 
participant is means there might m some circumstances ^ attention 0f reguiators in the past, 
knowledge about market participants who have co p{nliatorv authorities where market 
As at present, it would also require coordination among regulatory 
participants target investors in more than one province 
77 Securities Regulationh^da: An Inter-provincial Securities Framework (2003). 
28 Ibid at 11. 
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(c) Single Regulator 
There are various ways in which the move to a single regulator model could be achieved. 
Scenarios involving both centralized or decentralized enforcement could be envisaged. In other 
words, the model could involve a single enforcement division which would send teams of 
investigators around the country, or alternatively that the single regulator would maintain local 
enforcement offices in the larger provinces. 
The findings of the present study suggest that the latter option might be more effective at 
capitalizing on the local information gathering and surveillance connected to enforcement efforts. 
It would be obviously important to preserve local input into the setting of enforcement priorities 
in a national context, as well as into the rationalizing of the discretionary factors influencing 
sanction outcomes. 
One key issue would be whether or not there would be a single decision-maker applying a 
uniform set of administrative enforcement powers. Fewer decision-makers might enhance efforts 
at a consistent approach to the use of these discretionary factors. The present uniformity around 
the definition of the public interest suggests no particular obstacles to developing an articulation 
of a national public interest to be protected by securities enforcement efforts. 
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Appendix 1 
Penalties 
Penal Sanctions under Criminal Code, 1985 
Nature of Offence Maximum Years of Imprisonment 
Fraud 10 
Fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange 5 
Spreading false news 2 
False pretences or statements 10 
Gaming 5 
Conspiracy 10 
Short sales 5 
Breach of trust by public officials 5 
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Appendix 2 
Securities Commission Decisions 
British Columbia (2003-2000) 
1. Robert Pierre Lamblin et al 
2. American Gold Mining Corporation 
3. Robert Douglas McLean 
4. Carl Glenn Anderson and Douglas Victor Montaldi 
5. Fairtide Capital Corp et al 
6. Danny Francis Bilinski 
7. Specialized Surgical Services Inc. et al 
8. Jesse J. Hogan 
9. Malcolm Stevenson 
10. Andrew Rutherford Prowse 
11. Adamo Guerrini 
12. Frederick George Orr 
13. Tri-West Investment Club et al 
14. Randall Kane Garrod 
15. Gordon Dix Jr. et al 
16. Robert A. Diiannii 
17. Cartaway Resources Corporation et al 
18. Gill Financial Corporation and Nirbhia Singh Gill 
19. George Stephen Slightham et al 
20. Paul Schiller an Betty Schiller 
21. Jack Weatherell 
22. Noram Capital Management Inc. 
23. Andrew Willman 
24. Jean B Claude Hauchercorne 
25. TAC International Ltd. And Craig Southwood 
26. John Terrance Pyper 
27. Dean Ward Bishoprick 
28. Excel Asset Management Inc. et al 
29. Eron Mortgage Corporation et al 
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Alberta (2003-2000) 
1. David John Del Bianco et al 
2. Gordon Hunte 
3. Christopher Peter Agagnier 
4. Marc Lamoureux 
5. Cartaway Resources Corporation et al 
6. National Gaming Corporation et al 
7. Group Athletic Services Corp. et al 
8. Valiant Place Inc. et al 
9. World Stock Exchange et al 
10. Morrison Williams Investment Management Ltd. 
11. W.H. Stuart Mutuals Ltd. et al 
Saskatchewan (2003-1998) 
1. Darcy Lee Bergen 
2. Canadian Residents' Umbrella Plan and Sanjeeva Ranjan Singh 
Manitoba (2003-1998) 
1. David Wayne Finley 
2. Max Systems Inc. et al 
3. Roland Emile Terault 
4. Michael Sidiropolous 
Ontario (2003-2000) 
1. YBM Magnex International Inc. et al 
2. Stephen Duthie 
3. Meridian Resources Inc. and Steven Baran 
4. Brian K. Costello 
5. Jack Banks 
6. Lydia Diamond Exploration of Canada Ltd. et al 
7. Terry G. Dodsley 
8. Ronald Etherington and Create-A-Fund Incorporated 
9. Mark Edward Valentine 
10. Arlington Securities Inc. and Samuel Arthur Bnan i ne 
11. Piergiorgio Donnini 
12. Richard Thomas Slipetz 
13. Mikael Prydz 
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Quebec (2003-2000) 
1 Stevens Demers and Marie-Claude Coulombe 
2_ Coop Services et Recherches Sante 3E Millenaire (S3M) et Denis Roy 
3. Enviromondial Inc. 
4. Fonds de Croissance Emerging 3r Millennium Inc. et al 
5. Daniel Belanger et al 
6. Exploration Malartic-Sud Inc. et al 
7. Rampart Securities Inc. 
8. Elias Zilkha et al 
9. Jean Dussault (Interdiction de Prononcer) 
10. Guy Shedleur 
11. Premiere Etat Finance Inc. et al 
12. Benoit Laliberte 
13. Jitec Inc. and Benoit Laliberte 
14. Roger Gagnon and 2645-8083 Quebec Inc. 
15. Corporation Cinar 
16. Jacques Quirion et al 
17. Bombardier Inc. 
New Brunswick (2003-1998) 
1. Emile Arsenault 
2. Gordon Arthur Bond 
3. Bruce R.H. Logan 
Nova Scotia (2003-1998) 
1. Baie Chedebucto Bay Investment Fund Ltd. 
2. Evangeline Wind Field Inc. 
3. Northeastern Community Investment Incorporated 
Prince Edward Island (2003-1998) 
1. David Emery Morse 
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